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Abstract 
 
This study presents an alternative reconsideration of traditional Optimum Currency Areas 
(OCA) macroeconomic convergence criteria as options for West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ) commencement, in the light of recent advancements in monetary theory.  It presents 
micro-founded models, rooted in New Keynesian traditions to show that tests confirming 
widespread divergence from ideal macroeconomic benchmarks with unsustainable independent 
monetary and exchange rates pursuits and trade gravity models offer a more appropriate 
evaluating criterion for WAMZ than the current one, if the ultimate objective is a merger with 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).   Using econometrics methods, 
especially pooled single models applied to national macroeconomic data which span 1991Q1 to 
2007Q4,  I evaluate the roles of past unsustainable independent national monetary and exchange 
rates policy pursuits as determinants of macroeconomic stabilizations (reflected by the inflation 
differential and output gaps/performance vis-à-vis the WAMZ area targets) and inter/intra-
regional export performance.   This was accompanied by the estimation of a trade gravity model.  
The strong convergence of aggregate output/demand pattern between WAMZ countries based 
on trade gravity models thus emerges as a possible positive attribute of countries participating in 
efficient currency areas. 
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1.   Introduction 
The evaluation of WAMZ feasibility has been guided by both the general and 
“shocking” studies criteria (Ojo 2005; Nnanna 2007).  This approach insists on ex ante pursuit 
of macroeconomic policy convergence that leads to similarity of shocks and minimizes the costs 
of unionization (Mundell 1961, Kenen 1969) as a necessary precondition for the optimal 
operations of the OCA ex post.  However, several such convergence reports to the WAMZ 
authorities by the West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) returned a verdict that WAMZ was 
unripe for commencement in 2003 but suggested 2005 that was ultimately deferred to 2009.  
Nnanna (2007) also relied on macroeconomic convergence criteria to ask if a third 
postponement of the Eco Currency introduction for the WAMZ is unavoidable. A few number 
of other studies used a VAR model to analyze asymmetric shocks in West Africa following the 
standard techniques applied in industrialized countries, as pioneered by Blanchard and Quah 
(1989) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992).  Among them are Fielding and Shields (2001 & 
2003), Houssa and Leuven (2004), Ogunkola (2005) and Masson and Pattillo (2004) studies 
based on the optimum currency area literature, which focuses on asymmetries of shocks and 
fiscal distortions associated with independent monetary policy pursuits in the region. They show 
that countries that were very different with respect to fiscal distortion would be unattractive 
partners for a monetary union, because the central bank would produce undesirable outcomes 
for one or both of them.  In most of these studies, Nigeria was identified as an unattractive 
partner for the WAMZ monetary union, while suggesting selective accession to existing 
monetary union by intending members of this union to the WAEMU.   
Indeed, these traditional evaluation criteria tests provided by several studies on the 
desirability of the EMU were appropriate as the underlying basic assumptions of the model 
apply to market economies that are competitive, organized, developed and respond quickly to 
policy stimuli.   However the application of this model to African and ECOWAS countries 
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characterized by less developed regimented markets tended to produce indeterminate and 
undesirable results.   
There have emerged new literatures which show that real economic convergence which 
follow stronger trade ties rather than policy convergence may represent better evaluating criteria 
for the WAMZ.  Among them is Frankel and Rose (1998), Rose (2000), Debrun, Masson and 
Pattillo (2003), Anyanwu (2003), Hausman et al. (2001), Corsetti and Pisentti (2005) and 
Corsetti (2008) that argues that irrespective of the stage of development and economic 
structures, membership of a currency union  can boost intra-regional trade and could act as a 
veritable instrument for macroeconomic convergence ex post.  Their findings show that 
important beneficial effects follow ex post a monetary union through the promotion of trade and 
central bank credibility induced by unionization, which acts as an ‘agency of restraint’ for 
otherwise undisciplined independent fiscal impetus and monetary stance. Hence tying the hands 
of the monetary authorities through a regional constrain on monetary policy in the context of a 
monetary union would be a good thing.   
The problem this study is designed to examine revolves around mainly the failures of 
traditional evaluating criteria to lead to a determinate date for the commencement of the 
WAMZ.  In particular, there is an urgent need to explore alternative models to macroeconomic 
convergence criteria.  Such alternatives should capitalize on current socio-economic and 
financial structures of the WAMZ to show that ex ante convergence is unnecessary if the 
ultimate target is unification with WAEMU.  In particular there is the need to show that current 
independent monetary and exchange rates policy pursuits neither served as instruments for 
macroeconomic stabilization nor global/intra-regional trade stimulation and that trade gravity 
models may represent a better test for the commencement of WAMZ than macroeconomic 
convergence criteria. The rest of the paper presents a brief overview of WAMZ performance 
with macroeconomic convergence criteria in part 2.  Part 3 reviews the theoretical and analytical 
models.  Part 4 presents the results while Part 5 the concluding remarks and policy implications.  
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2. A Review of WAMZ Macroeconomic Convergence Criteria Targets and 
Performance, 2001-2006 
These criteria has its origin in traditional OCA theory which believes that countries 
exposed to similar symmetric shocks and business cycles, or possessing mechanisms for the 
absorption of similar asymmetric shocks may find it optimal to adopt a common currency.  
Much of this literature focuses on four inter-relationships between the members of a potential 
OCA. As observed by Frankel and Rose (1998) these are: the extent of trade; the similarity of 
the shocks and cycles; the degree of labor mobility; and the system of fiscal transfers (if any).  
The greater the linkages between the countries using any of the four criteria, the more suitable 
they are for a common currency.  These have been encapsulated in a number of primary and 
secondary quantitative targets that intending members of WAMZ must comply with prior to the 
commencement of the project.  They include: the attainment of single digit inflation that is less 
than 10 per cent; a budget deficit (excluding grants) to GDP ratio that must be equal to or less than 
4.0 per cent; central bank financing of the budget deficit that should be equal to or less than 10 
percent of previous year’s tax revenue and maintenance of external reserves to cover at least 3 
months of imports.   The targets for the secondary convergence criteria specified to compliment the 
primary ones are: that the level of domestic arrears should be equal to, or less than zero; tax revenue 
to GDP ratio must be equal to or greater than 20 percent; government wage bill to tax revenue ratio 
to be equal to or less than 35 percent; public sector investment to tax revenue ratio to be equal to or 
more than 20 percent; real interest rate to be greater than 0.0 percent, and lastly, the nominal 
exchange rate movement to be within the band of (± 15 percent)   
 Tables 1 show the summary of average regional performance of WAMZ participating 
countries with regard to the primary and secondary convergence criteria. The regional average 
performance shows that only the fiscal deficit/GDP ratio and maintenance of adequate foreign 
reserves criteria were met in 2006 on a region wide basis.  However, when analyzed from the 
perspective of the number of participating countries that met the criteria, Figure 1 show that two 
countries, The Gambia and Nigeria met all the four primary criteria in 2006; Guinea and Sierra Leone 
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Primary Convergence Criteria Performance Target 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Inflation Rate (end period) < 10% 15.2 11.6 22.1 11.5 13.4 11.5
Fiscal Deficit/Surplus/GDP (%) excl. grants 4 - 5%** -4.2 -4.5 -2.8 -2.0 -1.7 -1.3
Central Bank Fincg.of fiscal deficit as % of prev. yr’s tax rev. < 10% 17.9 12.3 27.7 4.6 0.0 13.5
Gross External Reserves (Months of Imports) (*) 3 months 7.4 5.5 4.8 9.7 13.2 20.3
Number of Criteria Satisfied 4 1 1 2 3 3 2
Secondary Convergence Criteria Performance Target
Change in arrears ≤ 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tax revenue/GDP ratio > 20% 14.70 10.70 12.10 15.20 19.40 15
Salary mass/Total tax revenue ≤ 35% 30.8 48.1 30.8 25.6 21.2 23.2
Domestically financed investment/Rev > 20% 31.0 69.5 48.4 28.4 38.2 39.0
Real interest rate > 0 -2.4 -1.3 -11.6 -6.3 -6.5 -5.9
Exchange rate Dep/App. (-/+) against WAMZ ERMII  +/- 15% 3.8 11.3 7.1 0.7 7.9 9.2
Number of Criteria Satisfied 6 3 2 3 3 3 3
(*) In months of imports CI;  ** 5% in 2001 - 2002 and 4% in 2003-2006
Source: Derived from data obtained from West African Monetary Institute Website: wami-imao.org
Table 1: Status of WAMZ Region-Wide Primary  and Secondary Convergence Criteria Performance
met 2 out of the 4 primary criteria, while Ghana met 1.  The graphical analysis of the extent of 
compliance with convergence criteria is as shown in Figures 2 and 3. Two inter-twined 
Figure 1: Number of Primary Convergence Criteria Met by 
WAMZ, 2001 - 2006
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preconditions were set for the commencement of WAMZ.  The first relates to participating 
countries eligibility criteria, which demands that they meet 4 primary and at least 6 secondary 
convergence criteria.  The second relates to the commencement date of the WAMZ which 
stipulates that an optimal date would be one in which at least 3 countries meet a minimum of 3 
primary and 3 secondary criteria immediately prior to the commencement of the union.  While the 
first requires conscious effort of each participating country fiscal and monetary authorities towards 
adopting sustainable policies, the second requires the need for synchronization of such policies with 
the regional target set for the collective endeavors.   
With regard to the first, the trend reflected in Figure 1 show that in 2004 to 2006, only two 
countries, the Gambia and Nigeria, progressed towards attaining the primary criteria.  Both met the 
primary criteria in 2006.  While Guinea progressively deteriorated in performance, Ghana and Sierra 
Leone met only two criteria during the period.    The situation is most precarious with regard to 
meeting the secondary convergence criteria.  While Nigeria met 4 of the secondary criteria, Gambia 
and Ghana met 3 out of the recommended 6 convergence criteria.  What this translates to is that 
Figure 2: Number of Secondary Convergence Criteria Met by 
WAMZ, 2001 - 2006
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only two countries met the prequalification criteria for the membership of the union as the score 
card for Guinea and Sierra Leone has not been encouraging enough. 
With regard to the second criteria, Figure 2 shows that since inception, the number of 
countries that met the primary convergence so far were 2, namely Gambia and Nigeria in 2006.  
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Figure 3: Performance with Meeting Minimum Criteria for 
Commencement of WAMZ, 2001-2006
Target 3 3 3 3 3 3
Primary 3 2 0 2 2 2
Secondary 1 0 1 2 2 3
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
However, the precondition for takeoff requires that a minimum of 3 countries must satisfy at least 3 
primary and 3 secondary convergence criteria.  The best attainment so far is that while three 
countries met 3 secondary convergence criteria, only 2 of them met the primary criteria which are 
considered a sine qua non for the commencement of the programme.  The most worrisome aspect 
of this situation is that there is no likelihood that up to 3 countries would meet these criteria given 
the didactic actions and apparent lack of policy coordination among them.  This would therefore 
tend to suggest the inevitability of another postponement at the end of the terminal period of the 
third phase of the WAMZ project.   It also tends to portend a gloomy prospect for the 
commencement of WAMZ within the foreseeable future.   
The prospect for macroeconomic convergence remain slim, given the fact that trade 
relations among WAMZ member countries remain very small.  Table 2 show the the average 
share of WAMZ intra-trade in total ECOWAS trade which stood at 2.76 percent in the period 
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Figure 4: Share of WAMZ in Intra-ECOWAS Total Trade, 
2003-2005
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WAEMU 88.3 90.2 88.6
WAMZ 11.7 9.8 11.4
ECOWAS 100.0 100.0 100.0
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2001 to 2005, with a peak of 3.22 
per cent in 2003.  Perhaps, the 
main reasons for this low level of 
trade relations include the use of 
multiple inconvertible currencies 
within the Zone, the narrowness 
of tradable products in member 
countries, existence of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to trade, 
multiple borders among the countries, and poor regional transportation infrastructure.  These 
fundamental reasons had very little to do with macroeconomic convergence as it cannot 
stimulate trade relations except ex ante actions are taken in that direction through regional 
integration which includes ultimately a monetary union.  One of the main objectives of creating 
the WAMZ is to promote trade among the members.   Apart from the single currency agenda, 
other important elements of the program include the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade through the implementation of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS), the 
adoption of a Common External Tariff (CET), and the implementation of the Interstate Road 
Transit Convention by the member states.  The implementation of the above measures, together 
with the creation of a single economic space in the Zone through the monetary union and single 
currency, are expected to significantly increase the volume of intra-trade in the Zone. Table 2 
show the total value of intra-
ECOWAS total trade by all the 
countries according to sub 
regional groupings within the 
region.  A comparison of the level 
of intra- ECOWAS trade shows that WAMZ countries trade less with other ECOWAS countries 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Avg.
0.41 0.29 0.42 0.37 0.38 0.37
Ghana 10.32 11.87 13.97 7.67 9.73 10.71
Guinea 0.25 0.35 0.40 0.76 0.34 0.42
Nigeria 0.20 0.19 0.30 0.36 0.36 0.28
Sierra Leone 4.16 2.96 1.01 1.07 0.94 2.03
Total: WAMZ intra-trade
to total trade
Table 2: WAMZ Country Share in Total WAMZ Trade
The Gambia
Source: Derived from data compiled from ECOWAS website: ecowas.
3.07 3.13 3.22 2.05 2.35 2.76
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as it accounts for an average of 11% annually of total intra-regional trade in 2003-2005 (Figure 
4). While WAEMU has other advantages over WAMZ, including the better contiguity of its 
states, the single currency of WAEMU is about the most important factor in the higher trade 
relations among its member states and has been credited as one major factor which fostered 
relative macroeconomic convergence.   It is therefore expected that a successful launch of the 
Eco would significantly improve intra-trade relations in WAMZ and which could become a 
veritable instrument for macroeconomic convergence ex post. 
3. The Theoretical and Analytical Framework 
The reconsideration of WAMZ convergence criteria is designed to show that the 
inability to use monetary policy as instrument of independent macroeconomic stabilization is in 
itself a sufficient test to confirm the need for subscribing to a monetary union. The model 
adopted for this study draws from various New Keynesian models that have been used in part to 
analyze the inflation differentials in the euro area (i.e. the degree of non-convergence of prices 
{Hofmann and Remsperger  (2005), Angeloni  and  Ehrmann  (2007), Altissimo et al. (2005), 
and Honohan and Lane (2003)}, and partly on new micro-founded model of the costs of 
adopting common currency, relative to an ideal benchmark in which domestic monetary 
authorities pursue country specific efficient stabilizations (Corsetti 2008).  In particular the 
empirical methodology specified for this study draws from Honohan and Lane (2003) and 
Horvath and Koprnicka (2008) who focus their attention to finding the relationship between 
inflation differentials and the role of exchange rate channel, output gap, fiscal policy, and the  
countries’ relative price level in a panel of euro area countries using annual data over 1999-
2001.  Honohan and Lane (2003) postulated a fairly general specification for inflation 
differentials as: 
)1.(])[]([)( *11
*
11 EqPPPPzz it
E
t
E
titit
E
tit
E
tit Lεδβππ +−−−+−=− −−−−  
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Where itπ  and are the annual national and euro zone inflation rates, respectively;  and  
denote national and euro area variables that exercise short-term influence on the inflation rate; 
 and  denote the national and euro area price levels,  and  represent the national 
and euro zone long-run equilibrium price levels.   In order to account for long run convergence, 
in the face of tight trade and institutional linkages, Honohan and Lane (2003) assume a common 
long-run national and euro area price level, simplifying Eq. 1 as: 
E
tπ itz Etz
itP
E
iP
*
itP
*E
tP
  )2.()()( 11 EqPPzz it
E
tit
E
tit
E
tit LLLLεδβππ +−+−=− −−
Horvath and Koprnicka (2008) noted that it is easy to realize that a combination of euro area 
variables results in a time dummy, and as such re-wrote Eq. 2 as: 
)3.(1 EqPz ititittit LLLLεδβφπ +++= −  
Where they define the z in line with Honohan and Lane (2003) as:  
  )4.(],,[ 1 EqFISCGAPNEERz ititit LLLLL−Δ=
Where  is the lagged change of nominal effective exchange rate;  denotes the 
output gap,  represent the fiscal deficit and is the lagged price level.  Horvath and 
Koprnicka (2008) estimated the following empirical specification: 
1−Δ itNEER itGAP
itFISC itP
)5.(13211 EqPFISCGAPNEER ititititittit Lεδβββφπ ++++Δ+= −−  
They noted that the time dummies )( tφ in Eq. 5 capture the common movements in inflation, so 
that the regression explains the inflation differentials in terms of idiosyncratic national 
movements.  Horvath and Koprnicka (2008) expectations of the coefficient on effective 
exchange rate β1  is negative, as exchange rate appreciation is expected to decrease inflation 
rate.  On the other hand, β2 is expected to be positive, as higher output gap results in more 
inflationary environment.  β3 is likely to be negative, as fiscal surplus reduces aggregate demand 
and therefore contributes to lower inflation.  The sign of δ is expected to be negative as lower 
price level is likely to be associated with higher inflation rate.  They further posit that for 
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obvious reasons, output gap and fiscal balance can be endogenous to inflation and therefore 
estimated Eq. 5 by the generalized method of moments (GMM), where endogenous variables 
were instrumented by lagged values.  
 This model appears adequate for analyzing EU Euro areas, especially so since inflation 
targeting is a central objective of monetary policy.  For the purpose of this study, I lean further 
towards Corsetti (2008) that analyzed monetary stabilization policies from a Neo-Keynesian 
perspective.  Corsetti (2008) uses a new micro-founded model of the costs of adopting common 
currency, relative to an ideal benchmark in which domestic monetary authorities pursue country 
specific efficient stabilizations that encompass both demand and supply stabilization.  The 
analytical framework is premised on the assumption of a closed economy populated by identical 
households, who derive utility from consumption of goods and leisure, i.e. their utility is 
decreasing in labour effort.  In the tradition of macroeconomic models, especially as in many 
modern contributions to monetary theory, he posits that aggregate demand coincides with 
consumption expenditure, i.e. abstract from investment and government spending.  From the 
demand side, Corsetti (2008) argues that if C denote aggregate consumption, and P its price (or 
CPI), then nominal aggregate demand is thus given by PC, and real domestic output YH 
coincides with real consumption expenditure, i.e. C = YH.  Corsetti (2008) therefore related 
aggregate demand PC to a variableμ , which indexes the stance of monetary policy: a higher 
μ means that monetary authorities pursue expansionary policies, raising aggregate demand and 
thus nominal consumption.  Corsetti (2008) therefore hypothesize that the dynamic aggregate 
demand in nominal terms which reflects optimal consumption and savings decisions by 
households can be written as follows: 
 )6.(
1
1
1
)1(
1 Eq
E
i
t
t LLL
⎟⎟⎠
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⎛
+
+=
μ
βμ  
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Where β  is the discount factor reflecting consumers’ impatience, E denotes expectations of 
future variables and the equation makes it clear that, for given expectations of future prices and 
future real demand, current spending (corresponding to the current monetary stance) μ  is 
decreasing in the nominal interest. 
 From the supply side, Corsetti (2008) assumes that output is produced in many varieties 
by specialized small firms with monopoly power  and characterized by production function such 
that:  where  denotes the level of productivity, identical across firms, l denotes 
employment under the assumption that  vary randomly at business cycle frequency.  He 
further assumes that if firms face demand for output that is constant price elastic and preset 
prices which maximizes their market value, such that it results from charging the equilibrium 
markup over expected marginal costs, the following equilibrium conditions obtains:  
,lHH ZY = HZ
HZ
. )7.(][ Eq
Z
wageEmkpMCEmkpP
H
HH LL⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡∗=∗=  
Where the marginal costs , the nominal wage divide by productivity and the equilibrium 
markup mkp is a decreasing function of the elasticity of substitution.  As the price is fixed over 
the production period, the (ex-post) realized markup will vary inversely with marginal costs.  
Corsetti (2008) assumes that labour market is competitive and varies proportionally with the 
monetary stance 
HMC
μ  and linking both 
 )8.(
tan
.
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typroductivi
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Abstracting from Eq. 7, Corsetti (2008) characterized the natural rate of employment (output) if 
all prices were flexible (i.e. in the absence of nominal rigidities) by assuming that each firm 
would maximize current profit by charging the equilibrium markup over current marginal costs: 
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)9.(.. Eq
Z
mkpMCmkpP
H
H
flex
H LLL
μ==  
Substituting the definition ofμ , the production function ,lHH ZY =  and re-arranging, yields the 
result that the natural level of employment (output), , is constant: nrl
 )10.(1 Eq
mkp
nr LLLLl =  
In the long run,  is a decreasing function given the monopoly of domestic firms and as goods 
become better substitutes, or regulation and competition policy reduces the average markups in 
the economy, the natural rate of employment and output rise.  At business cycle frequencies, the 
natural rate of output fluctuates with productivity, i. e. . 
nrl
nr
H
nr
H ZY l=
For an efficient monetary stabilization, Corsetti (2008) examined the macroeconomic 
implications of random fluctuations in current and future productivity, and optimal policy 
response to stabilize the economy (demand shocks). .  He therefore argued that holding 
monetary stanceμ  (hence nominal wages) fixed, a positive productivity shock (an increase 
in ) lowers marginal cost ex post. But if prices are preset, firms cannot take advantage of 
higher productivity to lower prices and raise output: a fixed 
HZ
μ  implies that aggregate demand is 
also fixed in nominal and real terms.  As a result firms satisfy current demand using less 
productive inputs, while the positive productivity shocks opens a positive output gap: 
employment and output fall short of their natural rate, i.e., their equilibrium value in a flexible 
price allocation.  
 In response to an unexpected increase in productivity, monetary authorities can improve 
welfare by expanding aggregate demand via expansionary stance (in the case of positive shocks 
(and contracting it in response to a negative shock, as to rule out over-heating and excess 
employment).  This it can do by setting monetary policy such that nominal marginal costs are 
constant during the period: 
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 )11.(Eq
Z
MC
H
LLLLτμ ==  
If the above holds, i.e. if private agents expect the central bank to credibly pursue rules such that 
τμ HZ= , optimal prices would remain constant in nominal terms also in the absence of 
nominal rigidities as there would be no difference between the Eq. 7 and Eq. 9.  Thus, a 
monetary rule that satisfies this condition make nominal rigidities inconsequential, in that the 
sticky price allocation coincides with the flex-price allocation and the economy operates at a 
natural rate.  Corsetti (2008) observed that Eq. 11 requires a central bank to commit to (a) align 
aggregate demand and (b) keep the price level along the predetermined path, indexed byτ .   
 With regard to interest rates and demand stabilization, Corsetti (2008) noted that 
traditional models of stabilization would require central banks to pursue interest rates policy 
corresponding to the optimal stabilization policy by substituting Eq. 11 into the dynamic 
demand equation, that is: 
 )12.(1)1(1
11
Eq
Z
Ei
Z HH
LLLL⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛+=
++ττ β    
He then derived the interest rate corresponding to the implementation of the optimal 
stabilization policy as: 
 )13(1ln1lnlnln
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Corsetti (2008) concludes from this expression that given the path of price levels τ to which a 
central bank commits when it defines inflation targets at different horizon, and holding 
expectation of future productivity constant, the natural rate of interest falls with current 
productivity gains – which, in the absence of a contingent optimal reaction by monetary 
authorities, would open a positive output gap that rises with anticipated productivity growth.  He 
further maintains that the need to promote a non-inflationary growth as in the condition in Eq. 
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11 would require that monetary authorities not only respond to current productivity shocks, but 
also to current aggregate demand disturbances.  
 Against this framework, Corsetti (2008) analyzed and compared the costs of losing 
monetary autonomy when it translates into insufficient stabilization of national business cycles 
to the apparent noise generated by subscribing to a common monetary policy rules.  He 
characterized the main inefficiencies from insufficient stabilization in terms of relative price 
distortions, which translates into suboptimal level of output and consumption.  He therefore 
argued that if the central bank does not stabilize marginal costs completely, demand does not 
fall optimally when productivity is low.  With preset prices, these turn out to be too high relative 
to factor costs, and firms supply too much relative to the flex-price level of output, and vice 
versa.   He therefore concludes that a highly unstable monetary policy could potentially produce 
large welfare losses, up to dwarfing the costs of insufficient stabilization.   
 Corsetti (2008) introduced trade and international interdependence into the model via 
nominal exchange rates under the assumption that growth rates of marginal utilities are 
equalized across countries in Purchasing Power Parity.  He argues that if the two countries 
involved in trade are perfectly symmetric ex ante, it means that wealth and consumption are 
always equalized in nominal terms across countries.  This implies that exchange rate depends on 
both home and foreign monetary stance.  He concludes that a commitment to a monetary union 
(in which the two countries adopt a common currency or irrevocably pegged exchange rates 
offer a least cost than two national monetary authorities acting independently or even under an 
international monetary policy coordination but which yields undesirable results.   
Empirical Models 
The empirical models to be estimated rely very strongly on the theoretical foundations of 
these New Keynesian models.  Two fundamental equations would be estimated in line with neo-
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Keynesian framework that independent monetary policies target both inflation and output as the 
central theme of macroeconomic stabilization.   
With regard to aggregate price stabilization around a preset target or benchmark, I adopt 
Horvath and Koprnicka (2008), i.e. Eq.  3:      
)3.(1 EqPz ititittit LLLLεδβφπ +++= −   
but with significant modifications. Whereas they define the vector z of Eq. 3 as: 
where ],,[ 1 ititit FISCGAPNEERz −Δ= 1−Δ itNEER  is the lagged change of nominal effective 
exchange rate;  denotes the output gap,  represent the fiscal deficit and  is the 
lagged price level, I redefine the vector z as:  
itGAP itFISC itP
],,,,,[ 21 ititititit iCGCPMyNERz −Δ= where 
 is the lagged change in nominal exchange rate of the national currencies to the US $, 
their dominant reserve currency; denotes the real output while is money supply, 
which is an important component of independent monetary policy targets of WAMZ countries, 
in the light of pursuits of multiple objectives of macroeconomic stabilization policy;  and 
 represents banking sector credit to private and government sectors respectively, to capture 
the loose stand of monetary policy with regard to government borrowing and the extent of bias it 
implies for private sector credit; and finally,  denotes the overall interest rate policy stance of 
the monetary authorities, represented in this model by the monetary policy rate or minimum 
rediscount rates.  This gives us the following empirical specification: 
1−Δ itNER
ity 2M
itCP
itCG
iti
)13.(162543211 EqPiMCGCPyNER ititititititittit Lεδββββββφπ +++++++Δ+= −−   
Whereby itπ  is the net inflation differential of each participating country from optimal targets; 
tφ  represents cross-sectional fixed effects constants of independent movements in inflation 
differentials within the panel; βs are regression coefficients of the included explanatory 
variables, δ the regression coefficient of past trends in aggregate price level.    
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 The expectation of the coefficient of nominal exchange rate β1 is negative, as exchange 
rate appreciation is expected to decrease inflation rate.  On the other hand, β2 is expected to be 
positive, as higher output gap results in more inflationary environment.  β3 is likely to be 
negative, as expansion in credit to the private sector is expected to lead to output expansion (a 
positive shock) and therefore contributes to lower inflation. β4 is likely to be positive , as 
expansion in credit to government is expected to lead to expansion in aggregate demand and 
therefore contributes to higher inflation. β5 is likely to be positive, as expansion in in aggregate 
money supply is expected to lead to expansion in aggregate demand and therefore contributes to 
higher inflation.   β6 is likely to be negative, as lower interest rates is expected to lead to output 
expansion (a positive shock) and therefore contributes to lower inflation.  The sign of δ is 
expected to be negative as lower price level is likely to be associated with higher inflation rate.  
This specification presupposes that the only ultimate objective of independent monetary 
policy is the need to stabilize local currency prices via interest rates operating procedures that 
supports low inflation and an exchange rates management (via expenditure switching 
transmission mechanisms) that minimizes demand for foreign goods.    
 However, price stabilization around the optimal path is not the only objective of 
monetary policy of the WAMZ countries as a number of rigidities exist which inhibits the 
capacity of factor prices such as interest and exchange rates from performing effectively 
expenditure switching transmission mechanism.  Indeed, these economies are characterized by 
large non-tradable sector which tends to compromise efforts at domestic and foreign price 
stabilization.  In line with Corsetti (2008), monetary policy stance can also give rise to welfare 
losses due to insufficient stabilization derived from the case in which domestic productivity 
shocks are purely idiosyncratic.  This suggests a reformulation of Eq. 13 to reflect the effect of 
monetary policy stance on productivity shocks or output gaps:     
)14.(162543211 EqyiMCGCPNERy ititititititittit ελααααπααϑ +++++++Δ+= −−  
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Where both the dependent and explanatory variables are as defined earlier, while tϑ  refers to the 
fixed effects constants of the pooled regression equation.  All theα s are the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables of the model, while λ  represents the coefficient of the lagged value of 
output gap.   
 The expectation of the coefficient of nominal exchange rate in Eq. 14 1α  is neutral since 
a home nominal depreciation following a home monetary expansion has no expenditure 
switching effects, but can potentially worsens terms of trade in favour of the foreign partner in 
trade. It can be potentially harmful if the foreign exchange content of domestic production is 
very high.  On the other hand, 2α  is expected to be negative, since higher widening gap of 
inflation from desired level could lead to higher costs of production and consequently lower 
output.    3α  is likely to be positive, as expansion in credit to the private sector is expected to 
lead to output expansion (a positive shock) and therefore contributes to higher growth in output. 
4α  is likely to be negative, if the potential goal of macroeconomic stabilization is to reduce the 
gap between consumption and its efficient level, which may vary with time depending on the 
state of the economy.  Credit to government and especially monetary authorities borrowing from 
the public through public debt instruments as part of monetary control measures can critically 
stifle credit to the private sector, with a crowding out effect and adverse effect on output.  5α  is 
likely to be negative if an expansionary monetary stance originates from fiscal indiscipline, 
weak monetary authorities that lacks autonomy to restrain fiscal authorities or from inability of 
the monetary authority to adopt an appropriate monetary framework in the face of deep internal 
economic distortions. This would generally have adverse effects on output.  6α  is expected to be 
negative, in line with Corsetti’s (2008) argument that given the path which monetary authorities 
commit when it defines inflation targets at different horizon, and holding expectation of future 
productivity constant, the natural rate of interest falls with current productivity gains.  This 
could potentially open a positive output gap in the absence of a contingent optimal reaction by 
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the monetary authorities, which rises with anticipated productivity growth. The sign of λ is 
expected to be negative as lower past values of output level is likely to be associated with higher 
output gap.  
 A combination of the two equations shows that a highly unstable monetary policy could 
produce simultaneously larger welfare losses which could be far more destabilizing than the 
costs of insufficient stabilization that is associated with loss of monetary autonomy.  These 
losses arise firstly through destabilizing impact on prices, and secondly through supply shocks 
effects and it is higher than the costs of losing monetary autonomy when it translates into 
insufficient stabilization of national business cycles. 
Alternative Trade Gravity Model Test 
The analytical model estimated in this section is rooted in the trade gravity models as 
propounded by Frankel and Rose (1997), Rose (2000) and Masson and Pattillo (2004). These 
authors maintained that a typical gravity model is usually specified to include as explanatory 
variables the product of the two countries’ real GDP, both in levels and per capita, the distance 
between them, and the land areas of the two countries. In addition, a number of dummy 
variables are included to capture the possible effects of common features of the countries: 
membership in a free trade area or currency union, a common language, border, or colonizer, 
etc. The gravity equation is typically specified in logarithms, so that:  
)15.()ln()ln()ln()ln(
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33210 EqDAreaAreaPop
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+++++= βββββ  
Whereby Xij is the bilateral trade between the two countries, Y is the real output, Pop is the 
population, Area denotes the land mass, D the various dummy variables.   This specification is 
consistent with Rose (2000) and a number of others.  It was also observed that the other variant 
of the endogeneity of OCA model as estimated by Frankel and Rose (1997) can be rendered as: 
 ( ) ( ) )16.(log, EqYYBTIQQCorr jiTijji LLL−+++= θλβα  
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This was however modified by Fidrmuc (2001) to include intra-industry trade intensity as one of 
the explanatory variables as follows: 
( ) ( ) )17.(log, EqYYBIITTIQQCorr jiijTijji LL−++++= θλγβα  
Whereby:  
 Bilateral Trade Intensity is defined as: 
 )18.(Eq
TT
T
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ij LLLLLLL+=   
Whereby Co-mov(Qi,Qj) stands for the co-movement of real gross domestic product , Q of 
country i and j.;  denotes the natural logarithm of bilateral trade intensity between country i 
and j defined in relation to export, import or total trade;  is a measure of intra-industry trade 
intensity; B is defined as the log of distance between a country or region and the nearest 
member; Y denotes the national incomes of the countries.   
T
ijTI
ijIIT
Abstracting from the above models the explicit form of the trade gravity model that is 
estimated in this section can be rendered as:  
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 Whereby the 
variables are defined as follows: 
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And , , BTEEijBETI
ME
ijBMETI i and BTEj BTMEi and BTMEj TTMEi and TTMEj denotes the 
bilateral export and total trade; YRi YRj, YNi and YNj are the real and nominal GDP of  countries i 
and j.  is the ratio of the agricultural (intra-industry) trade intensity of  both countries; 
 is the ratio of the agricultural and mining (intra-industry) trade intensity of  both 
countries; D
AG
ijIIT
AGMI
ijIIT
1 is a dummy for adjacency or common border; D2 is a dummy for common 
language; D3 is a dummy for common currency and D4 is a dummy for common colonial ties 
4. Empirical Results 
 The specific models estimated in this section are Eq. 13 , 14, 19 and 20.  
)13.(162543211 EqPiMCGCPyNER ititititititittit Lεδββββββφπ +++++++Δ+= −−  
)14.(162543211 EqyiMCGCPNERy ititititititittit ελααααπααϑ +++++++Δ+= −−   
The estimate of Eq. 13 is reported in Table 3 and it provides the pooled regression estimation of 
the monetary policy instruments determinant of inflation divergence in the WAMZ region.  The 
regression results of Eq. 14 is reported in Table 4 which show firstly, the implication of 
independent monetary policy pursuits on business cycles divergence or shocks (output gaps); 
and secondly the determinants of aggregate output performance given the national monetary 
policy stance of WAMZ participants.  These results would be discussed and inferences drawn  
under two sub headings: (i) “Partial Effects of National Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy on 
Inflation Divergence” which analyses the single pooled equation estimate for Eq. 13 and  (ii) 
“Partial Effects of National Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy on Output Performance” which 
analyses the pooled single equation estimate for Eq. 14.   
(i) Partial Effects of Independent National Monetary and Exchange Rate 
Policy on WAMZ Inflation Divergence 
Table 3 presents the regression results of the effects of independent monetary policy stance on 
inflation convergence around the less than 10 per cent target set for the commencement of 
WAMZ.   The adjusted R2 value, which measures the overall goodness of fit of the regression, 
show that independent monetary policy stance variables could only account for about 45 per 
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Dep. Variable: Inflation Differential:  
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section SUR)
Name Symbol Name Value t-Stat. Prob.  
Constant -2.07 -1.2 0.23
Nom.ER App/Dep. ?NERit-1 ß1 0.021 1.6 0.11
Real Output Shock yit ß2
Credit to Pr. Sect. Cpit(-1) ß3 -0.000012 -3.7 0.00
Credit to Govt. CGit(-2) ß4 -0.000001 -0.8 0.43
Money Supply: M2(-1) ß5 0.00001 4.3 0.00
Monetary Policy Rate Log iit ß6 2.25 4.0 0.00
Lagged Aggr. Price  (CPI) Pit-1 -0.011 -2.5 0.01
Fixed Effects (Cross)
_GAM--C -1.40
_GHA--C 0.90
_GUI--C -2.40
_NIG--C 2.71
_SLN--C 0.19
R-squared 0.47 0.96
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 1.29
S.E. of regression 0.97 298.4
F-statistic 28.41 1.47
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00
 Rate Policy on WAMZ Inflation Divergence (Eqation 3.12)
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
Source: Estimated using Eviews 6.1
Sample (adjusted): 1991Q3 2007Q4
Included observations: 66 after adjustments
Cross-sections included: 5
CoefficientVariables Statistics
Table 3: Pooled Single Equation Regression Results
 for thePartial Effects of Monetary and Exchange
Total pool (balanced) observations: 330
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat
Weighted Statistics
Mean dependent var
 
itπ
tφ
 
δ
cent of inflation divergence from 
set targets. It can be inferred that 
efforts at macroeconomic (price) 
stabilization around a desired 
target was not attained.  Over the 
sample period, the un-weighted 
average regional inflation rates 
were most often above a single 
digit target and vary widely 
among the countries. The 
summary of the descriptive 
statistics associated with the 
inflationary pattern displayed in 
Figure 5 is as shown in Table 4.  
This table shows that except for 
Gambia, all the WAMZ countries 
have had astonishing records of double digit inflation.  The country that recorded the minimum 
inflation rate during the study period is Gambia at an average of 5.6 per cent while Sierra Leone 
recorded the maximum average inflation rate of 29.3.  The table also shows that for more than 
half the period under review, both Gambia and Guinea recorded single digit inflation with the 
median statistics estimated at 3.3 and 7.0 per cent, respectively. These two countries can be 
described as the low inflation group among WAMZ while Nigeria and Ghana are the highly 
inflation group, with Sierra Leone joining the club after a protracted period of political crisis and 
instability.   
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The overall estimate of the fixed 
effects constant,
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Figure 5: Inflation Trends in WAMZ, 1991-2007
tφ , show significant 
variation in its value across the 
participating countries in WAMZ. Whereas, 
it exhibited a negative spread from the 
regional average in the case of the Gambia 
and Guinea, the countries with low records 
of inflation, it is positive for Nigeria, Ghana 
and Sierra Leone that have poor records of 
inflation control.  This finding tends to 
confirm that there is a wide divergence 
among the participants with regard to the 
average outcomes of price stabilization 
efforts, with very slim hope for attaining 
convergence with independent monetary 
policy pursuits. The trends in national 
consumer prices displayed in Figure 6 
shows the divergent growth path of prices in 
these countries.  The regression result also shows that the major monetary policy instruments 
determinants of inflationary divergence are the pursuit of distorted interest rates and 
expansionary monetary policies, which penalized credit and accentuated output supply/demand 
gaps, and exchange rates overvaluation.  
 M
 S
Gambia Ghana Guinea Nigeria S/Leone
 Mean 5.6 23.1 12.2 25.3 29.3
 Median 3.3 16.4 7.0 16.9 14.1
 Maximum 29.9 102.3 38.7 123.7 588.2
inimum -9.2 -13.8 -9.6 -17.5 -66.3
td. Dev. 8.3 21.1 11.2 30.2 78.6
 Skewness 0.7 1.2 1.0 1.3 5.6
 Kurtosis 3.2 4.9 3.0 4.6 39.6
 Jarque-Bera 5.4 26.1 11.2 26.8 4083.5
 Probability 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Sum 378.1 1550.4 817.5 1693.5 1966.0
 Sum Sq. Dev. 4518.9 29260.6 8280.8 60079.2 408136.0
Observations 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0
Table 4: WAMZ Inflation Descriptive Statistics,
1991Q1 to 2007Q4
Source: Estimated with Eviews 6.1 from the Regression Data
With regard to interest rates policy stance, the result shows that a 1% rise in interest rates 
generates about 2.25% rise in inflation rates.  This means that high monetary policy rates 
translated into high lending rates in virtually all the countries within the region. Two 
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Figure 6A: Trends in Nigeria's Interest Rates, 1991-2007
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fundamental issues belie the independent interest rate policies of WAMZ countries:  firstly, is 
the lack of clear cut policy rules for an objective determination of optimal interest rates.  The 
independent monetary authorities seem to set interest rates arbitrarily, neither following Taylor’s 
rules or the Neo Keynesian framework as the pass-through mechanism to inflationary control. 
The experience in Ghana and Nigeria is that monetary authorities were more concern with the 
adverse implication of cheap funds for foreign exchange management.  This was with a view to 
fostering both internal and external balance within a Mundellian framework of balancing the use 
of monetary policy represented by interest rate/reserve money control and fiscal policy 
represented by government expenditure.  This attempt was a colossal failure because monetary 
policy rates hike meant for stemming excess 
national demand could not restrain fiscal 
borrowing via ways and means, as well as 
through public debt instruments. 
The second is the pervasive internal 
economic distortion which accompanied the 
interest rates policy stance, especially the 
widened divergence between low savings rate which inhibits savings mobilization and high 
lending rates which resulted in credit apathy by both lenders and borrowers.  Financial market 
operators, especially the banking system 
capitalized on the distortions to diversify 
their portfolios from lending to speculations 
in money markets, in the face of a wide 
spread margin between savings and treasury 
bills rates which moved in tandem with the 
monetary policy rates.  Figures 6a and 6b show that both Nigeria and Ghana kept monetary 
Figure 6b: Trends in Ghana's Interest Rates, 
1991-2006
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policy rates high, even when savings rates suggest lower costs of funds, while the Gambia 
aligned her monetary policy rates to savings rates which eliminated speculations.  
 The coefficient of the change in 
nominal exchange rate variable is not 
significant, contrary to the expectation that 
devaluations drive the inflationary pressures 
of these countries.  It is however positively 
signed implying that it could potentially be a 
cause of inflation.  This result is expected, 
since the currencies of these countries are non-traded but pegged to a basket of currencies 
dominated by the US $.  The availability of the US Dollar quantitatively becomes the issue, 
while the effects of devaluation translate to imported inflation on a narrow basket of imported 
consumer and capital goods.  The experience, in most of the countries is that consumers resorted 
to local alternatives, while the significant efforts at foreign exchange controls through restrictive 
tariffs and quantitative controls accrued as rents to protected industries and traders.  This finding 
re-enforces the assertion that devaluation as an instrument of demand management approach to 
macroeconomic stabilization is rather ineffective to cope with economies that suffer from deep 
structural maladjustments.    
Figure 6c: Trends in Gambia Interest Rates, 
1991-2007
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 The coefficient of the past trends in national aggregate prices on inflationary 
convergence is significant and rightly signed.  The result showed that a 100% decline in 
aggregate price level would reduce the inflation gap by about 1.1%.  This natural growth path 
suggests that indeed inflation is not a monetary phenomenon and that macroeconomic losses 
which emanated from inadequate stabilization would be far greater than the noise generated 
from subscription to a convergence stance rooted in common monetary and exchange rates 
stance.  Also, credit to private sector exhibited the expected right and significant but inelastic 
relationship to inflation while credit to government variable turned out to be insignificant.  This 
 25
also confirms that it may not be very correct to blame fiscal indiscipline reflected in public 
sector borrowing from the banking system for spiraling inflation as the monetary authorities of 
these countries had often claimed.   
(ii) Partial Effects of Independent National Monetary and Exchange Rate 
Policy on WAMZ Output Performance 
The regression results of the estimates of the partial effects of national monetary and 
exchange rate policy on production shocks asymmetry among participating countries in WAMZ 
is presented in Table 5.  Two sets of equations were estimated.  The first estimated the effect of 
monetary policy instruments on output gap, measured by the extent of divergence between the 
national growth targets and 
attainment, denoted by tyΔ .  
The second evaluated the 
relative effectiveness of 
independent monetary and 
exchange rates policy on 
national economic 
performance, measured by the 
real Gross Domestic Product 
denoted by .    The adjusted 
R-squared of the regression 
results of  dependent  
equation (see table 5a) is very 
low, suggesting that 
independent monetary and exchange rate policy pursuits explained less than 15 per cent of the 
pervasive output shocks within the WAMZ in the study period.  A plot of the growth rates in a  
ty
Dep. Variable: Real GDP, yit  
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section SUR)
Coeff. Coeff.
Name Symbol Coeff. Value t-Stat. Prob  Value t-Stat. Prob.  
Constant 3.47 1.2 0.24 426.8 0.5 0.65
Nom.ER App/Dep. ?NERit-1 α1 -0.00093 -0.4 0.66 -4.7 -1.9 0.06
Inflation Divergence α2 -0.0296 -3.3 0.00 -7.6 -1.4 0.16
Credit to Pr. Sect. Cpit(-1) α3
Credit to Govt. CGit(-2) α4 6.69E-07 3.8 0.00 -0.0024 -14.8 0.00
Money Supply: M2(-1) α5 5.21E-07 4.7 0.00 0.0030 19.5 0.00
Monetary Policy Rate Log iit α6 -0.268 -2.3 0.02 -268.6 -4.0 0.00
Lagged Aggr. Output  (GDP) yit-1(-2) -0.873 -2.4 0.02 1058.3 9.9 0.00
_GAM--C -1.72 -5471.1
_GHA--C 0.92 -3244.0
_GUI--C -0.09 -6874.4
_NIG--C 1.96 20942.2
_SLN--C -1.08 -5352.6
R-squared 0.157 0.988
Adjusted R-squared 0.131 0.987
S.E. of regression 0.987 0.803
F-statistic 5.954 2568.9
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0
Mean dependent var -2.6 5.6
S.D. dependent var 3.1 4.5
Sum squared resid 310.5 205.7
Durbin-Watson stat 1.1 0.3
Source: Estimated using Eviews 6.1
a.     ?yit b.    yit
Statistics
Dep. Variables 
Weighted Statistics
Independent Variables Statistics
Fixed Effects (Cross)
Included observations: 66 after adjustments
Cross-sections included: 5
Total pool (balanced) observations: 330
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
Sample (adjusted): 1991Q3 2007Q4
Table 5: Pooled Single Equation Regression Results
 for thePartial Effects of Monetary and Exchange
 Rate Policy on WAMZ Output (Eqation 3.14)
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Figure 7: Trends in Real GDP Growth Rate (%) of WAMZ Countries 
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stacked graph as shown by Figure 7 suggests very strong business cycles asymmetry.  
Aggregate economic performance vacillated very widely around stagnation, with a good number 
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Figure 8: Real GDP of WAMZ Countries at 2001Constant
 Prices, 1991-2007 (US $ Million)
of the countries recording declining growths, while most had never attained up to 5 per cent 
growth rates.  The descriptive statistics associated with this graph is as shown in Table 6.  The 
statistics shows that mean average growth rates ranged from as low as 2.2 per cent for Sierra 
Leone to about 6.6 per cent for 
Guinea.   Gambia, Ghana and 
Sierra Leone had records of 
minimum growth rates that were 
negative, while Guinea output 
was most volatile ranging from a 
minimum of 0.9 per cent to a 
maximum of 190.4 percent.  In 
general, these countries are 
characterized by slow growth rates.  Another important source of asymmetry is the relative size 
of participating countries in the real aggregate demand of the region.  Figure 8 shows that 
Nigeria accounts for a significant 
proportion of the output WAMZ 
(approximately 80 per cent). 
Gambia Ghana Guinea Nigeria S/Leone
 Mean 4.0 3.8 6.6 4.1 2.2
1991Q1 to 2007Q4 %)
ce: Estimated with Eviews 6.1 from the Regression Data
Table 6: WAMZ Real GDP Growth Descriptive Statistics,
 Median 4.7 4.3 4.2 3.7 3.7
 Maximum 9.3 7.0 190.4 26.9 30.4
 Minimum -4.2 -4.3 0.9 0.0 -20.3
 Std. Dev. 2.9 2.7 22.8 3.3 11.4
 Skewness -1.2 -1.5 7.9 5.1 0.1
 Kurtosis 4.8 5.1 64.4 36.5 3.2
 Jarque-Bera 24.9 37.2 11217.4 3435.2 0.2
 Probability 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9
 Sum 266.4 251.4 444.5 275.0 147.6
 Sum Sq. Dev. 537.2 473.8 34445.1 702.8 8515.2
 Observations 67 67 67 67 67
Sour
The overall estimate of 
the fixed effects constant, tϑ , for 
both equations of Table 5 are not 
significant, but also reflects very 
significant variation in its value 
across the participating countries in WAMZ. Whereas, it exhibited a negative spread from the 
regional average in all the other countries, it posted a positive average for Nigeria.  This finding 
tends to confirm that there is a wide divergence among the participants with regard to the 
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average outcomes of macroeconomic stabilization efforts, with a higher disproportionate weight 
in favour of Nigeria that is obviously an outlier of the proposed convergence club.  This implies 
that pursuits of a less than optimal macroeconomic stabilization policy could have very negative 
spillover effects on efforts towards convergence.  The trend in National Real GDP displayed in 
Figure 5.5 shows the divergent growth path which tended to accentuate these asymmetries.   
The coefficient, 1α , of exchange rate devaluation, 1−Δ itNER , is not significant as a 
determinant of demand/output shocks within WAMZ in equation 5a, but exhibited an inverse 
relationship to aggregate output at about 6% confidence level.  This result tends to suggest that 
the production and asymmetric shocks experienced by these countries is not caused by exchange 
rate devaluation.   This is expected, since as a group of small countries, with non-tradable 
currencies, both export and import prices are preset in foreign traded currencies.  As such, 
exchange rates movements do not necessarily perform the expenditure switching stabilization 
roles envisioned by traditional theory.   Instead, exchange rate devaluation translates into higher 
costs of imported inputs and consumer goods.  The magnitude of these costs can be very high if 
the foreign resource content of domestic production and consumption is also very high, and 
economic activity is dominated by non-tradable and primary commodities export.  This assertion 
is consistent with regression results of Table 5b, which shows that 1% devaluation can 
potentially lead to about 4.7% decline in output.    
  On the other hand,  the coefficient, 2α , of inflation divergence variable, itπ  is negative 
and significant in the regression results of Table 5a, confirming the expectation that higher 
widening gap of inflation from desired level could lead to higher costs of production and 
consequently lower output.  Although the t-statistics of 5b results show that inflation is not a 
significant determinant of aggregate output in WAMZ, it exhibited a negative relationship 
confirming the earlier assertion.   
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The performance of credit to the private sector variable, , in the estimated equations 
was poor, and had to be eliminated from the regression, while the estimate of the coefficient,
itCp
4α , 
of the credit to government, ,  is significant and correctly signed but inelastic in both 
equations.  The positive sign of this coefficient in 5a suggests that credit to government, 
especially through the issue of public debt instruments as part of monetary control measures can 
critically stifle credit to private sector via a crowding out effect with adverse consequence on 
output performance.   
itCG
The coefficient, 5α , of the money supply variable, , is significant, positive but 
inelastic, in line with New Keynesian stance that expansionary monetary stance can spur limited 
growth when economies operate at less than full employment capacity. This is most likely the 
case, given the slow growth rates, and inelastic supply which characterize these countries.  
However, the inelastic outcome of this coefficient points to the weakness of using reserve 
control via monetary targets as an instrument for promoting growth.   
2M
The coefficient, 6α , of monetary policy rate, , is significant and exhibit the correct 
sign.  This is consistent with the literature (Corsetti, 2008) that given the path which monetary 
authorities commit when it defines inflation targets at different horizon, and holding expectation 
of future productivity constant, the natural rate of interest falls with current productivity gains.  
This could potentially open a positive output gap in the absence of a contingent optimal reaction 
by the monetary authorities, which rises with anticipated productivity growth.  
iti
The coefficient estimate,λ , of lagged aggregate output variable,  is significant and 
have the right signs in both equations.  The negative sign of this coefficient in 5a is consistent 
with theoretical expectation that lower past values of output level is likely to be associated with 
higher output gap.  The finding that past trends in output is the major determinant of current 
output performance is remarkable.  This implies that monetary policy pursuits, in the face of 
nominal and structural rigidities play insignificant role in demand/output stimulation.  Instead, 
2−ity
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trend in business cycles and output tended to follow the natural rate path which fluctuates with 
productivity along the production possibility frontiers. 
(iii) Trade Gravity Models Results 
Using pooled equation regression models, equations 19 and 20 are estimated for the 
WAMZ countries.  In general, I adopted the 5 x 2 cross sectional panel data to capture the entire 
bilateral relationships of Gambia-Ghana, Gambia-Guinea, Gambia-Nigeria, Gambia-Sierra 
Leone, Ghana-Guinea, Ghana-Nigeria, 
Ghana-Sierra Leone, Guinea-Nigeria, 
Guinea-Sierra Leone and Nigeria-Sierra 
Leone.  These results are as shown in 
Table 7.   Equation 7a represents the 
regression results for the bilateral export 
trade dependent variable, while that of 
7b is for the total bilateral trade 
dependent variable.  The independent 
variables can be grouped into economic 
or quantitative variables presumed to be 
the determinants of endogeneity and 
qualitative variables captured by the 
dummies.  The equations were 
estimated using seemingly unrelated 
regression models from a quarterly sample 1996:1 to 2004:4 amounting to 36 numbers of 
observations for 10 cross-sections making a balanced panel of 360.    
Dep. Variable
Indepent Variable Coef. t-Stat. Prob. Coef. t-Stat. Prob.
LOG(YRI*YRJ) 0.172 3.8 0.00 0.632 19.1 0.00
LOG{(Yi/Popi)*(Yj/Popj)} -0.370 -8.3 0.00 0.082 4.2 0.00
LOG(IITAGi/IITAGj) 0.064 4.1 0.00 -0.007 -3.6 0.00
LOG(IITAGMII/IITAGMIj) -0.635 -11.4 0.00 0.019 4.8 0.00
Fixed Effects
_GAMGHA--C 1.940 0.203
_GAMGUI--C 0.573 -1.123
_GAMNIG--C 0.779 1.985
_GAMSLN--C -0.115 -1.713
_GHAGUI--C 0.787 0.202
_GHANIG--C 7.578 2.151
_GHASLN--C -0.661 0.266
_GUINIG--C 4.098 1.853
_GUISLN--C 1.705 -1.071
_NIGSLN--C 2.230 1.978
R-squared 0.856 0.978
Table 7: Regression Results of Intra-WAMZ Trade Gravity Models 
a. BILAT. EXPORTS  b. BILAT. TOT. TRADE
LOG(BTEIJ) LOG(TTMEIJ)
Adjusted R-squared 0.851 0.977
S.E. of regression 0.980 0.203
Durbin-Watson stat 0.274 0.371
Log Likelihood 502
    Mean dependent var -0.51 7.479
    S.D. dependent var 2.534 1.351
    Sum squared resid 316.8 14.31
Estimated using Seemingly unrelated regression methods
The log linear regression models were estimated and the results are summarized into a 
table for analytical convenience.  A review of the estimated equations shows that their goodness 
of fit is high with adjusted R2 as high as 85% for both equations.  It is worthy to mention that 
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three groups of  the relationship of interest in this regression analysis are: (i) the effect of output 
covariability on trade intensity (which is proxied by the log of the product of the bilateral real as 
well as per capita GDP of the two countries; (ii) the effect of intra-industry trade on bilateral 
trade intensity (which is captured in this model by the agricultural and primary commodities 
intra-industry trade); and (iii) the effects of common features of the countries such as 
membership in a free trade area or currency union, a common language, border, or colonizer, 
etc. on bilateral trade.   
Bilateral Trade and Real and Per Capita GDP Relatives 
 As indicated in the theoretical framework, the OCA theory suggests that if there are 
similarities in the co-variation or correlation of outputs, it is expected to be positively related to 
the bilateral trade intensity between the two countries.  Two measures of output correlations in 
our model are: (a) log of the product of Real GDP of country i and j in the bilateral trade 
relations denoted by  and (b) the log of the product of their per capita income 
respectively which is denoted by 
)( RjRi YYLOG ∗
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ∗
j
Nj
i
Ni
Pop
Y
Pop
Y
LOG  .  This specification is consistent with 
Rose (2000).  These coefficients are significant especially that of the intra-WAMZ total trade 
model.  However, while the sign of the log of the product of real GDP variable is positive, 
confirming that similarities in business cycles have positive effects on bilateral trade among the 
countries, the coefficients of the product of the per capita GDP is negative.   This is 
consistent with the results of similar gravity models tests by Masson and Pattillo (2004) which 
seems to capture well the determinants of bilateral trade between countries.  The positive sign of 
the real GDP variable coefficient estimate agrees with their findings that larger countries exert a 
greater gravitational pull on imports and push to exports.  This is most likely to be true with 
respect to trade flows intra-WAMZ given the fact that Nigeria accounts for approximately 60 
per cent of the GDP, land mass and population of the group.  Her pull on imports is very 
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dominant especially so given her buoyant foreign exchange reserves derived from exports of 
crude oil.  She also seems to serve as a base for re-exports of food and other consumer products 
via informal trade within the ECOWAS sub region.   
The negative sign of the coefficient of the per capita GDP variable is also consistent with 
Masson and Pattillo’s (2003) findings that richer countries (in per capita terms) also tend to have 
higher trade and by implication poorer countries tend to have lesser trade.  This is largely true 
since a priori information on per capita incomes of the countries indicated that they are all 
classified among low income and somewhat below the poverty lines.  One is therefore not 
surprise that the sign of the coefficient of this variable is negative. The result can therefore be 
said to be salutary as it portends that improvements in per capita incomes of WAMZ countries 
could invariably be associated with greater trade in the absence of trade barriers and if supported 
with common currency.   This assertion is consistent with the per capita income ex post 
convergence theorists who maintains that regional integration especially the one advanced by 
creating a monetary union, may lead to convergence of income levels by stimulating growth in 
the poorer countries through increased trade (Masson and Pattillo (2004)).  They further argue 
that related initiatives to liberalize factor movements would also favor growth of poorer 
countries by allowing capital and labor to move to the locations where they are most productive.   
In general, this is consistent with the assertion by Jenkins and Thomas (1996) that “there is a 
growing consensus that ‘convergence clubs’ exist, where countries with a lower GNP per capita 
grow more rapidly because they are members of a trade group, or because domestic policy gains 
credibility by being tied to the domestic policy of a country with a better economic reputation”.  
Although for now, there are doubts with regard to fiscal credibility of the intending members of 
WAMZ, especially Nigeria, she can certainly gain from allowing her domestic monetary and 
exchange rate policy to be tied to a regional convergence benchmark if for no other reason but 
fiscal discipline effects.    
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Bilateral Trade and Intra-Industry Trade Intensity  
You would recall that from the point of view of endogeneity of OCA theory, if intra-
industry trade accounts for a high share in trade, then, ceteris paribus, business cycles are 
expected to become more similar across countries.  By contrast, increased bilateral trade 
intensity may lead to divergence of business cycles if the increase in trade is due mainly to 
increased specialization as predicted by the alternative OCA view (the Krugman’s specialization 
theory).   
In order to reflect both theories in our model, I included as explanatory variables and 
determinants of bilateral trade two variants of intra-industry trade variables: the first is defined 
as the log of the ratio of intra-industry trade in agriculture of both countries, ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
AG
j
AG
i
IIT
IITLOG , 
designed to capture endogeneity of OCA theory, as a priori information suggests very strong 
similarities in structure of agricultural trade.  The second is defined as the log of the ratio of 
intra-industry trade in primary commodities (agriculture and mineral resources), 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
AGMI
j
AGMI
i
IIT
IITLOG , designed to capture Krugman’s specialization theory effects, given the sharp 
differences in this variable between Nigeria and the rest members of WAMZ.  This stems from 
the fact that Nigeria is a major exporter of crude oil and a member of OPEC, a marketing cartel 
that was able over time to guarantee better terms of trade for her members, as against the 
deteriorating terms of trade faced by the other WAMZ members with regard to exports of solid 
minerals.   
 From the Table, it can be seen that the coefficient estimates of both variables are 
significant suggesting that intra-industry trade intensity have significant effects on bilateral 
trade.  However, while the sign of the parameter estimate of intra-industry trade in agricultural 
commodities is positive, that of bilateral primary commodities trade intensity is negative.   
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 The positive sign of the agricultural trade intensity variables suggest that the positive 
bilateral co-movements can, ceteris paribus, lead to trade creation within the region.  This is 
plausible, given the structure of agricultural trade within the region, which are mostly in staple 
foods especially grains, tubers, vegetable oils and livestock products (live animals, poultry and 
eggs).  Sufficient pockets of deficit in supply of these products exist within the region, 
especially in Nigeria, enough to pull imports towards her.  This fact is evidenced by the large 
food imports of these countries from the rest of the world which accounts for a significant 
proportion of their foreign exchange spending annually. Also, there are strong similarities in 
agricultural export baskets to the rest of the world, made up of cocoa, coffee, palm produce, 
groundnut and ginger, and they indeed face the same terms of trade.  This similarity is therefore 
supportive of the fact that opportunities exist to negotiate for better terms of trade as a regional 
group or trade bloc, an action that could lead to ex post convergence of business cycles and 
ultimately trade creation within the sub region.    
 The negative sign of the parameter estimate of the coefficient of the intra-industry trade 
in primary commodities is to be expected given the divergence in the structure of commodities 
trade basket.  While oil exports account for about 95 percent of Nigeria’s primary commodity 
exports, the other member countries of WAMZ relied entirely on agricultural and solid mineral 
exports.  Thus, increased dominance of a specialized product like petroleum in the export basket 
of Nigeria portends the fact that opportunities exist for trade expansion in the face of other 
endogenous factors such as proximity, adjacency and common currency.  While Nigeria’s 
exports of petroleum products to the other WAMZ member countries is expected to increase, a 
reciprocal increase in agricultural exports of these countries to Nigeria may also take place.  
Thus, in the event of the emergence of a monetary union, opportunities exist to internalize ex 
post a greater fraction of the region’s trade, given this significant and indeed negative 
divergence of these variables between Nigeria and the rest others.   
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Bilateral Trade and Qualitative Trade Gravity Indicators  
 You would recall that the third interest of the estimated gravity model is to measure the 
effects of common features of the countries such as membership in a free trade area or currency 
union, a common language, border, or colonizer, etc. on bilateral trade.  Consequent on this, 
four dummy variables were included in the regression analysis, viz.: adjacency, , 
common language, , common currency, , and common colonizer. 
.   
ADJDLOG )( 1
lANGDLOG )( 2 CURDLOG )( 3
COLDLOG )( 4
 The regression result is as shown in table 8.  In general, the coefficient estimates of these 
dummies were significant for the bilateral total trade but not significant for the bilateral export 
trade functions.   This result shows that intra-WAMZ total trade was significantly influenced by 
these variables.  While 
adjacency had positive effects, 
differences in currency and 
language had significant 
negative effects.  These tended 
to confirm the Rose effects of 
currency union dummies on 
trade expansion and/or 
contraction for the WAMZ.  A 
widely cited recent paper (Rose, 
2000), using a global sample, finds that currency unions increase trade by about a factor of 3 
from cross-sectional results while time-series analysis with fixed effects give somewhat lower 
estimates of around 1.7 (Glike and Rose, 2002). Although a simulation to estimate the effects of 
trade gravity models on the extent of trade creation has not been carried out, it is most likely that 
the outcome will compare favorably with these results.  This would be subject to particularities 
Dep. Variable
Indepent Variable Coef. t-Stat. Prob. Coef. t-Stat. Prob.
C -10.036 -7.9 0.00 -4.702 -14.3 0.00
LOG((GDPI?)*(GDPJ?)) -0.262 -2.3 0.02 0.363 12.2 0.00
LOG((NGDPI?/POPI?)*(NG 1.112 11.4 0.00 0.878 31.8 0.00
LOG(XAGI?/XAGJ?) 0.238 15.4 0.00 0.00012 0.1 0.96
LOG(XAGMII?/XAGMIJ?) -0.819 -14.9 0.00 -0.122 -14.3 0.00
DCUR? -3.329 -6.9 0.00 -2.746 -34.4 0.00
LOG(DADJ?) 0.184 0.9 0.37 0.095 3.3 0.00
DCOL? -1.100 -8.0 0.00 -0.481 -13.7 0.00
R-squared 0.376 0.752
Adjusted R-squared 0.362 0.747
S.E. of regression 2.153 0.680
Durbin-Watson stat 0.080 0.032
Table 8: Regression Results of Intra-WAMZ Trade Gravity Models 
 a. BILAT. EXPORTS  b. BILAT. TOT. TRADE
LOG(BTEIJ) LOG(TTMEIJ)
Which Include Trade Dummies
Log likelihood 206.7
    Mean dependent var -1.44 7.479
    S.D. dependent var 2.696 1.351
    Sum squared resid 1502 162.5
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which Masson and Pattillo (2004) pointed out.   In particular, they note that “while it is useful to 
have the widest sample possible if that sample is homogeneous, it may also be the case that 
there are particularities in a region that make it not comparable to others”.  Perhaps the non-
significance of these dummies with regard to the bilateral trade coefficients could be attributed 
to these “particularities” such as lack of common borders and common currency, while the 
dummies for common language and common colonizer are not strikingly distinguishing enough 
to make a difference.   Lack of common border becomes much more important, in the face of 
weak transportation links within the ECOWAS sub region and between many African countries.  
The Rose effect could also have been compromised by poor data on regional trade, as there 
seems to be a consensus among policy analysts that an appreciable unrecorded trade takes place 
within the sub region.  
5. Summary, Challenges, Policy Recommendations and Conclusions 
This study presents an alternative reconsideration of traditional Optimum Currency 
Areas (OCA) macroeconomic convergence criteria as options for WAMZ commencement, in 
the light of recent advancements in monetary theory.  It presents micro-founded models, rooted 
in New Keynesian traditions to show that tests confirming widespread divergence from ideal 
macroeconomic benchmarks with unsustainable independent monetary and exchange rates 
pursuits and trade gravity models offer a more appropriate evaluating criterion for WAMZ than 
the current one, if the ultimate objective is a merger with WAEMU.    
 The results show that: (i) substantial macroeconomic costs have been associated with 
monetary autonomy reflected in the wide divergence of outcomes from set benchmarks, with 
very little prospect for moving towards macroeconomic convergence in the absence of 
internationally binding monetary policy coordination framework; (ii) that  exchange rates do not 
perform the stabilizing role envisioned by traditional OCA theory, as it is an inconsequential 
determinant of intra-WAMZ exports, but translates into higher domestic inflations; (iii) a 
common monetary policy given the significance of trade gravity dummies in the regression, 
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confirms that it can be more efficient than nationally differentiated policies, even when shocks 
are strongly asymmetric, provided that the composition of aggregate spending tends to be 
symmetric at union-wide level.   The strong convergence of aggregate output/demand pattern 
between WAMZ countries based on trade gravity models thus emerges as a possible positive 
attribute of countries participating in efficient currency areas.   
Alternative Perspectives on the Challenges and Policy Options for WAMZ 
This study presents a new perspective of the challenges which confronts the WAMZ 
projects by debunking the traditional theories of inevitability of macroeconomic convergence as 
the sole criteria for determining its commencement. It noted that the pitfall of such arguments is 
the erroneous assumptions that ex ante policy environment is a good mirror of ex post outcomes 
with monetary unionization as has been the case with the EU (characterized by advance 
economic and financial market structures) experience.  However, the review of the background 
to this study show that participating countries in WAMZ are characterized by weak economic 
and financial structures and undue fiscal impetus which compromises independent monetary and 
exchange rates policies that have kept participating countries from attaining macroeconomic 
convergence in the foreseeable future.  The only comparable monetary union to the WAMZ is 
that of WAEMU (with similar economic and financial structure to WAMZ) whose experience 
show that their union was not preceded by insistence on attainment of macroeconomic 
convergence, but that unionization had served as a veritable instrument for the attainment of 
macroeconomic convergence ex post.  This further lends support to the findings of the trade 
gravity models as viable alternative tests to macroeconomic convergence criteria tests, with the 
conclusion that new perspectives of the real challenge to WAMZ union be identified.   In the 
light of these findings, this study agree with Ojo (2005) and Nnanna (2007) that the real 
challenge to WAMZ commencement is not macroeconomic non-convergence, but lack of 
political will and commitment on the part of all stakeholders towards full implementation of the 
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schemes along the path taken by WAEMU (the first monetary zone with which WAMZ must be 
merged to obtain the ECOWAS monetary union).  Among these challenges are: 
a) Inadequate political commitment on the part of the  participating countries that have 
continued to draw up their independent annual economic programmes without taking 
into consideration the regionally agreed benchmarks or matching same with adequate 
financial support. 
b) Political instability characterized by military dictatorships, poor governance practices 
and civil conflicts which have been part of the history of these participating countries in 
WAMZ.  These not only prevent these countries from pursuing sustainable  independent 
fiscal, monetary and exchange rates policies, but accentuated the degree of non-
convergence as well as alienates crisis afflicted members of the Zone from the much 
needed technical and financial support by external partners and foreign investors. 
c) Poor sustainability of policy actions towards the process of monetary unionization, 
especially by the major economies of WAMZ (Nigeria and Ghana) and their failure to 
provide the desired leadership and role similar to that which Germany and France played 
in the European Union integration programmes. 
d) Poor Communication and sensitization strategy reflected in: 
 apparent lack of clearly defined communication strategy for winning the support of 
the government and people of participating countries; 
  weak dissemination of information on progress made and the relative inability to 
stimulate and encourage the necessary complimentary technical preparations by all 
stakeholders; 
 Doubts, uncertainty and lack of information of what the transition to a single 
currency would involve 
 Doubts about the gains and benefits of the projects among influential elites and major 
stakeholders.  
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Recommended Policy Options 
The lesson to be learned so far from the review of the constraints and challenges to the 
WAMZ projects is the need to adopt a credible and feasible integration model that is capable of 
addressing these constraints.  In this context, the choice of model should be guided by the 
overriding need to curtail fiscal impetus and indiscipline that hampered the effectiveness of 
erstwhile independent monetary and exchange policies.  It should also be one which capitalize 
on and exploit the ex ante strong endogenous factors and the results of the trade gravity tests to 
proceed on establishing the monetary union in anticipation that it could act as instruments for 
the achievement of macroeconomic convergence of WAMZ  ex post. The WAEMU can be 
studied further to identify the optimal policy and institutional framework for the WAMZ.  In 
particular, the core strategic elements of the integration model to be adopted should be 
compatible with the enabling environment, the existing state of financial infrastructure and 
human capacities.  Above all, it should be a model that can garner support and assure all 
stakeholders that the gains from the project far outweigh the costs in addition to eliminating 
implicit doubts and fear associated with the anticipated changes.  In the light of these, this study 
recommends the following policy options: 
a) A vertical integration options similar to that of WAEMU should be adopted for 
integrating the national central banks, common monetary policy and currency 
managements so as to make the future merger of WAMZ with it easy to accomplish for 
the region-wide ECOWAS common currency.  This means that WAMZ should consider 
fusing together their existing central banks into one regional central bank, instead of the 
proposed maintenance of a system of national central banks (similar to the EU) which 
requires the need for the attainment of ex ante macroeconomic convergence. 
b) A complimentary political and over-sight institutional arrangements similar to that of the 
WAEMU, meaning that WAMZ would be headed by Conference of Heads of States, 
while the common central bank would be headed by a Council of Ministers that should 
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include Finance Minister of member countries.  However, unlike WAEMU, this body 
should be expanded to include the Governor of each of the participating central banks 
(the promoters of the union) as executive members of the West African Central Bank 
governing board.  It is recommended that they be designated as Vice President and Head 
of Country Operations of the proposed regional bank as a way of garnering their support 
instead of relegation to the position of Branch Managers which is the current situation 
under the WAEMU arrangements.  
c) An adoption of institutional and administrative options for the supra-national central 
bank that is modeled along the lines of the BCEAO, the common central bank of the 
WAEMU.  This suggests the creation of a single regional monetary authority for 
managing the internal and external value of the envisaged common currency and 
guaranteeing its integrity through implementation of credible management strategies. 
d) An adoption of a monetary policy option that is consistent with the integration model 
chosen.  In this wise, the West African Central Bank should possess instruments 
autonomy to set ultimate objectives, intermediate targets and operating procedures for 
the implementation of union-wide monetary policies without interference from any 
participating country’s government within or outside the sub-region. 
e) An adoption of a payment systems framework that takes into account the current habit 
and preference of the people in the region to transact in cash as against cheques, credit 
cards or other bank instruments.  This requires making adequate provisions for cash 
dispensing machines.  This should also be accompanied with the development of region-
wide payment systems. 
f) The adoption of an exchange rate mechanism and convertibility arrangements such that 
the initial parity rate is one that is optimal and socially acceptable by all stakeholders.  It 
is recommended that this should be determined as a weighted average (using either stock 
of external reserves or any other criteria as weights) of the exchange rates of the existing 
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national currencies of participating countries to the US Dollar at the time of 
commencement of the common currency.  It is also recommended that the Euro and not 
the US Dollar should be adopted as the main reserves currency of the WAMZ given the 
dominance of the EU countries as trading partners. 
Concluding Remarks 
The overall contribution of this study to knowledge is that it debunked the inevitability 
of macroeconomic convergence criteria as the most optimal options for the commencement of 
the WAMZ.  Indeed, it was established that given the ex ante independent fiscal and monetary 
policy pursuits of each of the participating country, there is the likelihood that not more than two 
countries can meet these criteria, suggesting that the commencement date could remain 
indeterminate.  It also shows that there are alternative empirical tests of OCA that offer more 
credible evaluating criteria for the WAMZ project than the macroeconomic convergence 
criterion.  It further reinforced the our conviction that opportunities exist for the stakeholders to 
advance the common currency project, given the trade gravity model results to commence the 
programme since their independent monetary and exchange rate policies have had adverse 
effects on economic growth and inflation in WAMZ countries.   
In conclusion, it is desirable to note that the relative ineffectiveness of independent 
monetary and exchange rates policies stemmed in part from the lack of political autonomy of the 
national monetary authorities (the central banks,  which hitherto led to a compromising stance 
with respect to its choice of instruments for monetary controls) and partly to inappropriate 
choice of instruments, with inherent bias against growth, but laying very strong foundation for 
inflationary spiral.  It does appear that under this macroeconomic environment, there is little 
prospect for improvement except some alternative actions are taken to overcome the 
overbearing political influence.  This study has shown that this can be found in entering into a 
currency union, with the surrender of monetary and exchange rate policy to a superior body. 
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